<p>The accident rate was appalling. Veteran pilots referred to the run as 'The Aluminum Trail', because there was a wreck for almost every mile of its length, more than 450 planes downed. Maintenance had to be done at night, when the aircraft were cooler. To touch their metal skins during the day produced second-degree burns. Spare parts were in great demand, and short supply. When new planes did arrive, crews got the impression that they had been hastily assembled and never checked out, and they required much too much time in maintenance.
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<p>Air Transport Command took over the Hump operation in December 1942. The tonnage began to rise steadily, only interrupted for causes like monsoon rains that turned the bases into mud sloughs. And each time that things seemed to be going well, another customer had an urgent need for air cargo.
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<p>In March 1944, British units defending against an enemy drive into Assam urgently needed air resupply. In May, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell began his Burma offensive and became another airlift customer. The Twentieth AF moved its B-29s into China and staged raids from forward bases near Chengtu, China, and they also drew on ATC air supply.
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<p>And always, Generalissimo Chiang and his representatives in Washington pressed for increased tonnages of supplies, reminding US leadership of the precarious position of loyal Chinese troops.
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<p>Late in the war, the single air lane across the Hump had broadened to a 200-mile (320-km) wide air corridor through which about 650 planes moved every day. The Burma Road never carried more than 6,000 tons of supplies in any month, a figure exceeded routinely by planes from several of the Assam bases. The record performance was given on 1 August 1945, when Hump pilots flew 1,118 round trips, carrying 5,327 tons of supplies without a single accident or incident.
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<p>It was a prodigious accomplishment, ferrying 650,000 tons of freight by air across a treacherous stretch of mountains. It consumed men and planes, ruined health and careers, wasted money and materiel. Yet the offensive war in that theater could not have been waged without it; it was the only way to go.
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<p>The true return on the awful investment came later. The experience gained at such cost was the foundation of worldwide strategic airlift operations, and on that foundation the Berlin Air Lift would be built three years later.
